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1.  Introduction 
 
The fact that on average pensioner incomes have grown faster over the past 20 years 
than those of the working population in the UK, despite the decline of the basic state 
pension relative to average earnings, is primarily due to the growth in occupational 
pensions and investment income.  These two components also account for the 
majority of the difference between the incomes of the better-off and poorest 
pensioners.  Hence much of the explanation of the differences in the incomes of 
pensioners is likely to lie in their earlier working lives, in their ability to accumulate 
pension rights and savings.  In addition, assets accumulated during working lives, as 
well as providing income in retirement, are also decumulated to some degree in the 
retirement phase of the life-cycle, further boosting the financial position of pensioners 
with them. 
 
Despite its importance, relatively little is known about the relationship between the 
incomes and wealth of the elderly and their employment and earnings histories during 
their working lives.  However these links between the financial position of pensioners 
and economic aspects of their earlier working lives are vitally important and lie at the 
heart of the pensions debate.  They are particularly relevant for the important policy 
debate on the adequacy of savings for retirement. 
 
In the standard “stripped down” life-cycle model assets accumulated during working 
life and held at retirement will be proportional to lifetime earnings.  This paper 
provides evidence on these inter-temporal relationships between the pre- and post-
retirement phases of the life cycle.  In particular it examines the proportionality 
hypothesis.  It also examines the role of an individual’s employment history. 
 
The next section gives a very brief description of the relationship of interest in the 
context of the life-cycle model.  The measurement of the income and wealth variables 
used is described in Section  3, while that of the working-life earnings level is 
described in Section 4.  Sections 5 and 6 present the results for income and wealth 
respectively and conclusions are given in Section 7. 
   2
2.  Working life influences on pensioner income and wealth 
 
The living standards of pensioners depend strongly on asset accumulation during their 
working lives.  This paper looks at the impact of working life history factors on 
pensioner incomes and wealth.  The life-cycle model provides economists’ standard 
framework for thinking about inter-temporal allocation.  It has been used to study this 
allocation at many different frequencies, including across stages of the life cycle, such 
as between working life and retirement (Browning and Lusardi, 1996, Browning and 
Crossley, 2000).  Saving for retirement plays a central role in Modigliani’s original 
formulation of the life-cycle model.  The central feature of the life-cycle model is that 
economic agents attempt to smooth consumption over time (in the sense of holding 
marginal utility constant), in particular in the current context to equate the pre- and 
post-retirement marginal utilities. 
 
In the standard “stripped down” life-cycle model asset accumulation during working 
life will be proportional to lifetime earnings.  Modigliani and Friedman both argued 
for the proportionality of consumption (and hence saving) to lifetime income.  In a 
world without uncertainty this will result if one assumes inter-temporal additivity in 
conjunction with the within-period utility function taking the iso-elastic (constant 
coefficient of relative risk aversion) form (although other combinations of 
assumptions can also give such proportionality).  In the standard model this 
proportionality of consumption then leads to the level of wealth at retirement also 
being proportional to lifetime earnings. 
 
The evidence on these predictions is mixed.  A number of US studies have found that 
savings and wealth are disproportionately higher in households with high lifetime 
incomes, i.e. that the savings-to-lifetime-income and wealth-to-lifetime-income ratios 
rise with income (Diamond and Hausman, 1984, Dynan et al., 2000, Hubbard et al., 
1995, inter alia).  Others have found that these ratios do not rise with income 
(Gustman and Steinmeier, 1999, and Venti and Wise, 1998, inter alia).  In addition in 
the context of a more general model than described above, Engen et al. (1999) find 
that the distribution of US wealth-earnings ratios has thicker tails at both ends than 
predicted by their calibrated stochastic life-cycle simulation model. 
   3
3.  The measurement of income and wealth 
 
The empirical analysis in this paper is based on the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS), which contains a nationally representative sample of households whose 
members are re-interviewed each year.
1  Wave 5 (1995/6) of the survey is used, since 
in addition to the information collected at each wave it provides information on 
financial assets.  The analysis in this paper is restricted to “pensioners”, defined 
throughout to be those of state pension age or above (65 for men, 60 for women).  
This section describes the methods used to construct the income and wealth variables 
used to test the proportionality hypothesis. 
 
The standard practice in the literature measures an individual's current economic 
position by the equivalised weekly net (disposable) household income of the 
household to which he or she belongs.  An individual’s standard of living depends not 
only on his or her own income, but also on the income of other members of the 
household.  Thus although the unit of analysis is the individual, the conventional 
approach takes the equivalised income of a household to represent the standard of 
living of each individual in the household. 
 
Net income is defined here as in the Department of Social Security's Households 
Below Average Income (HBAI) reports.  Full details of the construction of this 
variable on the BHPS are given in Bardasi et al. (1999).  It is the sum across all 
household members of: cash income from all sources (income from employment and 
self-employment, investments and savings, private and occupational pensions, and 
other market income, plus cash social security and social assistance receipts and 
private transfers (e.g. maintenance)) minus direct taxes (income tax, employee 
National Insurance Contributions, local taxes such as the community charge and the 
council tax) and occupational pension contributions.
2  Incomes are adjusted to a 
consistent pounds per week basis and then equivalised on the basis of household size 
and composition to allow for differences in household “needs”, using the McClements 
(before housing costs) equivalence scale (see DSS, 1998).  The scale reflects the 
                                                           
1 See Taylor (1996) for details. 
2 Income components are measured over the month prior to the interview or the most recent relevant 
period, except for employment earnings which are ‘usual earnings’.   4
extent to which households of different size and composition require different levels 
of income to achieve the same standard of living.
3 
 
Summary statistics of total income by family type are given in Table 1, using the 
DSS-HBAI classification of family types.
4   Pensioner family units have lower 
incomes on average than the rest of the population.  They typically have higher 
incomes than single parents, but lower than the three other non-pensioner family 
types.  Equivalised incomes are on average lower for single pensioners than for 
pensioner couples.  This is partly due to the fact that single pensioners are on average 
older (and pensioner incomes decline with age) and more likely to be women (due to 
differential mortality rates by gender): single pensioners have a mean age of 75 
compared with 70 for pensioner couples and 77% of single pensioners are women. 
 
The financial position of pensioners can also be considered in terms of assets.  The 
three most important categories of wealth are housing wealth, pension wealth 
(including both private and state pensions) and financial assets.  These categories play 
different roles in the process of accumulation and decumulation over the life-cycle.  
Pension wealth is non-tradable, financial wealth is typically fairly liquid and housing 
wealth lies somewhere in between. 
 
Net financial wealth is calculated as the sum of savings and (financial) investments 
less any non-mortgage debt.
5  Savings includes bank, building society and post office 
accounts.  Investments include shares, unit trusts, PEPs, premium bonds, national 
savings certificates, national savings / building society / insurance bonds, government 
and company securities and other investments.  Non-mortgage debt includes hire 
purchase, mail order purchase, credit card debt, personal loans, DSS Social Fund 
loans and any loans from individuals.  For couples equivalised joint wealth is used.
6 
                                                           
3 A single person household is taken as the reference point.  This contrasts with the practice in HBAI 
reports which use a couple without dependents as the reference point. 
4 See Department of Social Security (1998) for details.  A family is defined to be a single adult or a 
couple plus any dependent children.  A household may contain more than one family unit. 
5 Respondents unable or unwilling to give an exact amount receive supplementary questions providing 
ranges.  These are allocated conditional weighted median values in the analysis here.  See Juster and 
Smith (1997) for evidence on the benefits of this type of question in the context of US survey data. 
6 Equivalisation is on the basis of the McClements scale, as for incomes, but at a family unit rather than 
household level.  This involves taking 61% of joint wealth for couples, viewed as putting them on a 
comparable basis to singles.  This is a similar factor to one calculated from basic state pension values.   5
 
One in eight pensioners have zero or negative net financial wealth.  In all 27% have 
net financial wealth of less than £1,000.  The median level is £5,000.  Thus many 
pensioners have little or no liquid wealth.  At the other end of the distribution, over a 
quarter of pensioners have individual net financial wealth of £20,000 or more, one in 
ten over £55,000.  The distribution of financial wealth is heavily skewed.  Pensioners 
who are part of a couple typically have greater (equivalised) financial wealth than 
single pensioners.  Among single pensioners, men typically have greater financial 
wealth than women. 
 
Net housing wealth is calculated for home owners as the estimated value of their 
home less the estimated value of any outstanding mortgage debt.  78% of pension 
couples and 47% of single pensioners own their own home.  Of these, about one in ten 
have some outstanding mortgage debt.  The value of the property is derived mainly 
from the respondent’s expectation of what they would expect to get for their home if 
sold today.  There is then some imputation of missing values from other available 
information.  The outstanding mortgage debt is estimated from information on the 
amount originally borrowed, the year the mortgage on the property started and the 
years left to run on the mortgage.
7  About 5% of pensioners own other property that 
they are not currently living in.  The value of the property net of any outstanding 
mortgage is calculated in a similar way and included in net housing wealth.  Around 
half of single pensioners have housing wealth, with women have slightly more than 
men.  Pensioner couples are both more likely to have housing wealth than single 
pensioners and typically have more of it when they do. 
 
To complete the measurement of total wealth a measure of that held in pension 
entitlements is required.  Pensioner wealth is calculated as the expected present 
discounted value (EPDV) of future pension entitlements.  This involves multiplying 
the level of pension income by an annuity ‘factor’ (Dilnot et al., 1994), this factor 
being the inverse of the implied annuity ‘rate’.  This is broadly equivalent to the 
approach taken to valuing annuities in a number of recent papers (e.g. Mitchell et al. 
(1999), Finkelstein and Poterba (1999, 2000)).  Under the assumption that pension 
                                                           
7 6% of single pensioner home owners own their homes jointly with someone else.  In this case equal 
shares are assumed.   6












=+ ∑  
 
where YA = pension income at age A, r = expected real rate of return,
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life with non-zero probability,
9 and St = the survival probability to age t for someone 
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where qj = the mortality rate at age j defined to be the probability that someone aged j 
will die before they reach age j+1.
10 
 
Two sets of mortality rates are used, with separate mortality tables for men and 
women in both cases.  The first set, for the population (of Great Britain) as a whole, is 
that from the Government Actuary’s Department (GAD).
11  The second set is 
compiled by the Continuous Mortality Investigation Bureau of the Institute of 
Actuaries (1999) and is for “life office pensioners”, that is to say those in insured 
occupational pension schemes.
12  The rates are for normal retirements and are based 
on the experience of the 1991-94 quadrennium from offices in the United Kingdom 
and the Republic of Ireland.  The base specification here uses the GAD mortality rates 
and a real interest rate of 3%.
13  Variations from this base are then considered.  Over 
two-thirds of pensioners have (non-state) pension wealth and the overall median 
                                                           
8 This calculation ignores the term structure of interest rates.  See Finkelstein and Poterba (1999) on 
this in the context of calculating the money’s worth of annuities. 
9 T needs to be at least as large as the highest age with a non-zero survival probability.  It is effectively 
set here by the limit of the life table used.  In the calculations used below it is set to either 100 or 120 
depending on the life table used. 
10 Rowlingson et al. (1999) use a simplified formulation that assumes a fixed age of death and survival 
probability of 1 up to that point. 
11 These are the ‘Interim Life Tables’ for 1997-99 and are ungraduated: see www.gad.gov.uk. 
12 These are the mortality rates used by Finkelstein and Poterba (1999) for their annuity worth 
calculations. 
13 This is the same rate as used by Disney et al. (1998), while Rowlingson et al. (1999) use a rate of 7% 
in their construction.   7
(equivalised for couples) is £7,700.  Both the proportion with any and the magnitude 
are higher for couples than singles and for men than women. 
 
Finally a similar calculation for state pensions (and other state benefits) is conducted 
to give total wealth.  Summary statistics on the total wealth (joint and equivalised) 
held by pensioners in wave 5 of the BHPS are given in Table 2.  It has an overall 
median of about £85,000.  Mean wealth compares reasonably well with that 
calculated by Rowlingson et al. (1999) using data from the 1995/6 Family Resources 
Survey.
14  Pensioner couples have higher total wealth (joint and equivalised) than 
single pensioners.  There is a less clear difference between single men and women: 
women have a higher mean but a lower median.  The underlying calculations indicate 
that on average about half of pensioners’ total wealth is held in the form of future 
pension entitlements, about a third as housing wealth and about a sixth as net financial 
wealth. 
 
4.  The measurement of working-life earnings level 
 
The estimates of earnings during working life used in this paper are constructed from 
the retrospective information on work histories collected on waves 2 and 3 of the 
BHPS.
15  The BHPS does not provide historical information on the wages or earnings 
received during their working lives for current pensioners, and such information 
would probably be very unreliable gathered retrospectively if it was sought.  Instead 
the construction used here combines BHPS information on the occupational 
classification of the jobs held during their working lives with earnings information 
from the New Earnings Survey (NES), with the matching done using information on 
3-digit (“unit group”) occupational classification, age, gender and full-time/part-time 
status.  The aim is to provide a measure of the smoothed or “permanent” level of 
earnings over an individual’s working life. 
 
The first stage of the process uses the unified BHPS work-life history files (Halpin, 
2000) to construct a month-by-month panel containing the above variables for each 
                                                           
14 They estimate a mean pension wealth among pensioners that is about £4,000 higher than that 
calculated here and their estimate of mean non-pension wealth is closer to, but slightly lower than, that 
calculated here.   8
individual’s entire working life (giving a sample of around 1.8 million person-month 
observations). 
 
The second stage constructs estimated earnings using the NES.  A significant part of 
the pensioners’ work histories of course took place before the New Earnings Surveys 
started being conducted.  In addition the occupational classification system used in the 
NES has changed over time.  The currently used Standard Occupational Classification 
(SOC), which is also used to code occupations in the BHPS work-history files, was 
only used to classify occupations on the NES from 1991 onwards.  Prior to 1991 the 
earlier KOS system was used (and in its early days an even older system).  Thus using 
NES earnings data by occupation prior to 1991 requires the use of at least a KOS-to-
SOC mapping.  This would introduce considerable measurement error.  It is an open 
question whether this is greater or smaller than the benefit from using earnings data 
referring to an earlier date. 
 
The alternative strategy adopted here is to use only NES data from 1991 onwards.  
This circumvents the mapping-induced measurement errors, but ignores changes over 
time in occupational earnings differentials.  Data is used from the New Earnings 
Surveys for 1991-99 inclusive.  This gives highly accurate earnings information and a 
sample of around 1.3 million observations. Earnings data for all years are adjusted to 
a 1995 basis using average earnings.  Averages of gross weekly earnings at the 3-digit 
occupational level are then combined with 1-digit regression-based adjustments for 
age, gender and full-time/part-time status.
16  Regression equations for the log of gross 
weekly earnings are estimated for each of the 9 “major group” (i.e. 1-digit) 
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where A is age, F is an indicator for female and P is an indicator for female and 
part-time.  The estimated regression coefficients are then used to scale average 
earnings in the 3-digit occupation “unit” groups within each “major” group.  For each 
                                                                                                                                                                      
15 In particular the construction uses employment status information for each labour market spell 
collected at wave 2 and occupational information for each employment spell collected at wave 3. 
16 Those earning less than £1 or more than £6000 per week are excluded: about 0.01% of observations.   9
3-digit occupation j and each age a and within each of these for men (f = p = 0), 
women working full-time (f = 1, p = 0) and women working part-time (f = p = 1), 
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where  j Y =  average weekly earnings in occupation  j,  j A =  average age in occupation  
j,   j F =  proportion female in occupation j and  j P =  proportion female and part-time 
in occupation j.  This gives predicted gross weekly earnings on a 1995 basis for each 
of 371 3-digit occupation “unit” groups at each age from 16 to 70 for men, for women 
working full-time and for women working part-time.
17 
 
In the third stage of the process these estimated earnings figures (converted from 
weekly to monthly) are matched into the BHPS month-by-month work-life history 
panel from the first stage.  This provides a synthetic estimated-earnings history for 
each individual for their entire working life.  A number of variables can then be 
constructed from these earnings histories.  Two main work-life history variables are 
used in this paper.  The first is the average value of estimated earnings across those 
months of the individual’s lifetime that the individual worked.  This average is taken 
over the months between entering the labour market and the state retirement age (65 
for men or 60 for women). 
 
The second variable considered is the number of months that the individual worked.  
The product of these two variables is an estimate of pre-retirement lifetime earnings.  
However it may not be a very good measure of the level of resources or living 
standards available during working life.  Since it is a measure of earnings only, 
months when the individual is not working (during for example unemployment or 
early retirement) contribute zero to lifetime earnings.  An alternative would be to take 
the measure of resources to be proportional to earnings averaged across the working 
                                                           
17 Where needed those below 16 are assumed paid as 16-year-olds.   10
months.
18  Thus the average earnings measure on its own could also be viewed as a 
lifetime measure – under complete earnings replacement. 
 
5.  Results for income 
 
Estimates are presented for the elasticity of current income with respect to the average 
value of estimated earnings across the individual’s working life.
19  Simple log-linear 
equations with additional demographic controls are used.  Dummy variables are 
included for couples, for females and the interaction between the two.  A full set of 
age dummies (or equivalently birth cohort dummies) is included.  The first row of 
Table 3 gives OLS estimates of the elasticity (with robust standard errors in 
parentheses).  The first column is for the full sample.  The effect of earnings level in 
working life is highly significant (a t-ratio of 14.0).  Income differences between 
pensioners are strongly linked to earnings-level differences during their working 
lives.
20  The elasticity is also significantly less than 1. 
 
The remaining columns of the table give estimated elasticities from equivalent 
equations estimated on demographic sub-samples: pensioner couples and male and 
female single pensioners.  This partitioning reveals clear and significant differences in 
the elasticity across these groups.  For pensioner couples and for male single 
pensioners the estimated elasticity is not significantly different from 1.  For these two 
groups the proportionality hypothesis is supported by the data.  The estimated 
elasticity is significantly lower for single women at 0.33. 
 
Thus the earlier finding that the overall elasticity is significantly less than 1 is entirely 
due to single female pensioners.  This is likely to reflect the exclusion of the working-
life earnings level of any past partner: the current income position of single female 
pensioners may be more closely related to the earnings level of any past partner than 
their own.  The distribution of the ratio of current income to average working-life 
                                                           
18 Since the variable is to be used in log form, the constant of proportionality does not need to be 
specified. 
19 For couples the average earnings values are combined and equivalised to match the income 
construction. 
20 For an analysis focused on the link between pensioner poverty and earnings in working life see 
Stewart (2001) and for the link between pensioner poverty and employment history see Bardasi and 
Jenkins (2002).   11
earnings is considerably more dispersed for female single pensioners than for 
pensioner couples and male single pensioners.  The coefficient of variation of the ratio 
is 0.64 for pensioner couples, 0.70 for male single pensioners and 1.02 for female 
single pensioners. 
 
The remainder of Table 3 presents modifications, either to the estimation method or to 
the specification of the equation, to investigate the robustness of these findings.  In the 
first of these, the results change very little when a linear age structure is imposed on 
the large set of age dummies used. 
 
If the equation estimated represents a correctly specified model for current income 
conditional on average earnings during working life and if any non-response or 
stratification is exogenous, then weighting is unnecessary (the unweighted estimator 
is unbiased and efficient) and may induce heteroskedasticity.
21  This is further 
complicated if, as here, the construction of the available survey weights has involved 
endogenous variables.  In the equation specified here, the results are very similar 
when sampling weights are used. 
 
Around 1 in 10 of the full sample have missing information that prevents the 
construction of average earnings in working life (mainly missing work-life histories).  
These individuals are excluded from the estimated equations described so far.  The 
next line of the table uses an alternative procedure, including dummy variables for 
cases with no work-life history records, no earnings in lifetime and other reasons for a 
missing value, setting the log-earnings variable to zero and using all observations.  
The results are very similar.  The proportionality hypothesis is accepted for pensioner 
couples and male single pensioners and rejected for female single pensioners. 
 
When the log of the number of months over which earnings during working life is 
averaged is added to the equation, it is insignificant in the combined sample and in 
each of the three demographic sub-samples.  Pensioner incomes are not influenced by 
the amount of their working lives for which they were employed.  The inclusion of 
                                                           
21  Significant differences between weighted and unweighted estimates would be evidence of 
misspecification (for example due to parameter variation) and require investigation rather than covering 
up by the use of weights (DuMouchel and Duncan, 1983).     12
this variable has little effect on the coefficient on average earnings in working life (the 
next row Table 3) and the hypothesis that the two coefficients are equal (giving the 
lifetime measure described above) is strongly rejected by the data.
22 
 
The next issue considered is the influence of potential outliers in the data.  The robust 
regression estimates, which downweight or remove outliers iteratively on the basis of 
scaled absolute residuals, are very slightly lower for pensioner couples and female 
single pensioners.  However the estimates are all fairly similar and the main 
conclusions are exactly the same.  Since the median is less sensitive than the mean to 
outliers, median regression estimates are also examined.  Here too, while the 
estimated coefficients are reduced slightly, the main conclusions receive further 
support.  Overall the conclusions on the elasticity of current income with respect to 
average working-life earnings are not sensitive to outliers. 
 
Finally, results for a further partitioning of the sample are presented: those above and 
below 75.  For all groups the elasticity is smaller for those aged 75 and above than for 
the under 75s (although it is only significantly so for female single pensioners).   
Never-the-less, for both age groups the elasticity is insignificantly different from 1 for 
couples and male single pensioners and significantly less than 1 for female single 
pensioners. 
 
This proportionality does not result from proportionality for all components of 
income, rather there is offsetting.  Investment and pension income are the main 
sources of inequality in pensioner incomes and also form the main link with a person's 
past working life.  Income from these sources alone is examined next.  Table 4 
presents results from the estimation of log-linear equations for the sum of investment 
and pension income and in particular gives estimated elasticities with respect to 
average earnings level during working life. 
 
Around 10% of pensioners have no income from either of these sources.  The first 
row of the table gives results from OLS estimation of the equation for those with non-
zero income from these sources.  For all pensioners combined the estimated elasticity 
                                                           
22 The test gives t-statistics of 10.0 on the combined sample and 8.0, 4.2 and 5.1 on the three 
sub-samples.   13
is 1.756 and it is significantly greater than 1.  It is also significantly greater than 1 for 
each of the three demographic sub-groups given in the table.  The estimated elasticity 
is larger for pensioner couples and male single pensioners than for female single 
pensioners, as was the case for total income, but even for female single pensioners 
this elasticity is significantly greater than 1. 
 
These estimates are biased downwards by the exclusion of those without income from 
these sources from the sample.  The next row of the table uses a simple transformation 
to address this issue: ln(y+1) is modelled instead of ln(y) and those with zero values 
are included.
23  The estimated elasticity increases slightly for each sub-group and for 
the combined sample.  While simple and "robust" (in that no distributional 
assumptions are required) this method of estimation ignores the special nature of the 
zeros (as corner solutions in the underlying model).  The standard way of tackling this 
uses a Tobit model.  The estimated elasticities from Maximum Likelihood estimation 
of the Tobit model are given in the next row of the table.  The elasticities further 
increase slightly for each of the sub-groups and for the combined sample. 
 
Tobit model estimation relies heavily on the normality assumption for the error term 
in the latent equation.  To address this the final row of the table uses censored least 
absolute deviations estimation (Powell, 1984), which does not require distributional 
assumptions.
24  For single pensioner groups the estimated elasticity is higher than that 
from the Tobit model.  For pensioner couples it is lower.  For all groups it is 
significantly greater than 1.  It is still smallest for female single pensioners, but even 
for them this estimator gives an estimated elasticity of around 2. 
 
The measure of income considered here, while very general and corresponding to the 
semi-official one, has some deficiencies as a measure of pensioners’ financial 
position.  It excludes housing, which is important for their overall financial position.  
A factor for imputed rent based on the measure of housing wealth described earlier 
could be incorporated.  Instead the approach taken in the next section is to look 
                                                           
23 Since the mean of y is fairly large, the adjustment required to give an estimate of the elasticity of y 
evaluated at the mean is negligible. 
24 Bootstrap standard errors are given.   14
directly at total wealth.  This also addresses the issue of non-income bearing 
investments. 
 
6.  Results for wealth  
 
Equivalent estimates to those presented above for total income are also presented for 
total wealth (including pension and benefit wealth) in Table 5.  The same 
demographic controls are included.  The first row of the table uses the GAD mortality 
rates and r = .03 to construct the pension and benefit components of total wealth.  The 
estimated elasticity for the sample of all pensioners is 0.77, strongly significant 
(t = 14.9) and significantly less than 1.  This latter is due to female single pensioners 
as it was for income (and presumably for the same reason).  For male single 
pensioners the estimated elasticity is insignificantly different from 1, while for 
pensioner couples it is significantly greater than 1.  For pensioner couples this 
estimate is based on using an earnings variable that combines that of the two partners.  
If only the husband’s earnings are used, the estimated elasticity (in the next column of 
Table 5) is reduced and is insignificantly different from 1 at the 5% level. 
 
The remainder of Table 5 presents corresponding estimated elasticities under 
modifications to the construction of the wealth variable, to other elements of the 
equation specification and to the estimation method.  The results change relatively 
little if r = .05 or r = .07 are used or if the CMI occupational pensioner mortality rates 
are used in place of the GAD ones, although for the GAD rates with r = .05 or .07 the 
elasticity for couples using husband’s earnings is insignificantly different from 1 at 
the 1% level, but significantly so at the 5% level.
25  As for the current income 
regressions, neither the use of weights nor the inclusion of those with missing values 
for average working-life earnings together with an indicator variable make much 
difference to the results.  The inclusion of the log of the number of months over which 
earnings during working life is averaged has little effect and the hypothesis of 
equality of the two coefficients is again strongly rejected.
26 
 
                                                           
25 The elasticities are also very similar when the CMI rates are used for occupational pensioners and the 
GAD rates are used for those not in receipt of an occupational pension.   15
The results are also similar if either robust regression or median regression is used in 
place of OLS to weaken the influence of outliers.
27  The estimated elasticity for those 
aged 75 and over is slightly higher than that for the under 75s for male single 
pensioners and slightly lower for female single pensioners.  For all pensioners 
combined the elasticity is higher for the under 75s than for the older group.  However 
the general conclusions are the same as above for both age groups. 
 
As is the case with income, the wealth in state pensions (and other social security 
benefits) are crucial to the above findings.  The corresponding elasticity for wealth 
excluding this component is examined in Table 6.  The results are very different to 
those for total wealth in the previous table.  Even when those without positive 
non-state-benefit wealth are excluded (6% of the overall sample), the estimated 
elasticity is significantly greater than 1 for the combined sample and for all three 
demographic sub-groups.  The inclusion of the non-positive values, using a 
transformation, Tobit estimation or the more robust censored least absolute deviations 
estimation all reinforce this finding. 
 
7.  Conclusions 
 
The source of much of the difference between pensioners’ financial positions lies in 
their earlier working lives, in their ability to accumulate pension rights and savings.  
This paper finds a strong link between the incomes and wealth of pensioners and their 
average earnings level during their working lives.  The estimated elasticity of income 
in old age with respect to average earnings during working life is insignificantly 
different from 1 for pensioner couples and male single pensioners, in line with the 
prediction of the simple “stripped down” life-cycle model, but is significantly less 
than 1 for female single pensioners (possibly due to the role of the earnings level of 
any past partner).  The estimates of the elasticity of total wealth with respect to 
working-life earnings are in line with this, although for pensioner couples this is only 
the case if only the husband’s earnings are considered in the construction. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
26 The test gives t-statistics of 14.1 for the combined sample and 11.3, 3.4 and 9.0 for the three 
sub-samples. 
27 In this case too the elasticity for couples using husband’s earnings is insignificantly different from1 
at the 1% level, but significantly so at the 5% level.   16
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Table 1 
 
Equivalised income by family type 
£ per week 
  Family Type 
  Single  Pensioner Couple with Couple w/o Single with Single w/o 
 pensioner  Couple children children children children  Overall
    
Mean  129.11 159.18 167.41 219.44 122.79 177.23 177.29
Median  104.46 128.46 148.08 200.38 96.20 159.35 153.54
Upper quartile  149.36 189.33 197.72 269.97 137.61 221.89 218.87
Lower quartile  80.98 92.34 107.94 143.08 70.88 108.05  104.75
    
 
Notes: 
1.  Data from BHPS wave 5 (1995). 
2.  Incomes are in £/week and equivalised. 





















      
Mean 95.5  99.2  121.9  109.7 
Median  78.3 75.2 95.5 85.8 
Upper  quartile  120.2 123.1 144.6 133.6 
Lower  quartile  45.4 47.4 62.3 53.5 
      
 
Notes: 
1.  Data from BHPS wave 5 (1995). 
2.  Total wealth (financial wealth + housing wealth + pension (including state-pension) wealth) 
measured as joint wealth of pensioner family unit and equivalised. 
3.  Sample size = 1,476. 
   19
Table 3 
 














        
OLS with age dummies  .532  1.092  .960  .329 
 (.038)  (.075)  (.198)  (.042) 
        
OLS with linear age term  .533  1.122  .909  .308 
 (.038)  (.072)  (.176)  (.043) 
        
Weighted LS  .500  1.095  .909  .297 
 (.039)  (.071)  (.222)  (.041) 
        
Added missing value indicators  .484  1.081  .967  .333 
 (.037)  (.075)  (.196)  (.042) 
        
With log(months) added  .542  1.087  .988  .331 
 (.039)  (.077)  (.189)  (.045) 
        
Robust regression  .502  1.063  .965  .300 
(with respect to outliers)  (.036)  (.071)  (.192)  (.039) 
        
Median regression  .495  1.033  .930  .273 
(i.e. Least absolute deviations)  (.046)  (.098)  (.262)  (.061) 
        
OLS, age < 75  .645  1.119  .984  .416 
 (.049)  (.080)  (.252)  (.058) 
        
OLS, age ≥  75  .370 1.005  .931  .222 
 (.059)  (.181)  (.317)  (.059) 
        
 
 Notes: 
1.  Each cell of the table gives the estimated elasticity from a separate regression. 
2.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
3.  Controls included: couple, female, the interaction between them, and 
individual age dummies. 
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Table 4 
 















        
OLS on non-zeros only  1.756  2.606  2.955  1.342 
 (.120)  (.215)  (.562)  (.149) 
        
OLS on transformed dependent   1.989  2.867  3.463  1.598 
variable (including zeros)  (.116)  (.211)  (.535)  (.143) 
        
Tobit 2.182  2.935  3.793  1.845 
 (.130)  (.225)  (.634)  (.180) 
        
Censored least absolute   2.452  2.643  4.036  2.172 
deviations estimation  (.150)  (.194)  (.701)  (.217) 
        
 
 Notes: 
1.  Each cell of the table gives the estimated elasticity from a separate regression. 
2.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
3.  Bootstrap standard errors are given for the CLAD estimates. 
4.  Controls included: couple, female, the interaction between them, and 
individual age dummies. 
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Table 5 
 
Elasticities of total wealth with respect to average working-life earnings 
 














       
OLS using GAD   .767  1.431  1.185  1.151  .521 
mortality rates and r = .03  (.052)  (.090)  (.099)  (.241)  (.059) 
       
r = .05  .793  1.471  1.220  1.190  .542 
  (.053) (.093) (.101) (.248) (.061) 
       
r = .07  .817  1.508  1.251  1.225  .562 
  (.055) (.095) (.104) (.255) (.063) 
       
CMI mortality rates  .762  1.426  1.181  1.144  .518 
  (.051) (.090) (.099) (.240) (.058) 
       
Weighted  LS  .739 1.448  1.209  1.107 .491 
  (.057) (.098) (.107) (.283) (.063) 
       
Missing value indicators  .715  1.420  1.188  1.135  .517 
and  full  sample  (.050) (.090) (.099) (.239) (.060) 
       
With log(months) added  .811  1.411  1.191  1.155  .572 
  (.051) (.090) (.101) (.246) (.059) 
       
Robust  regression  .781 1.431  1.241  1.270 .509 
(with respect to outliers)  (.049)  (.095)  (.103)  (.239)  (.058) 
       
Median  regression  .779 1.494  1.188  1.237 .484 
(i.e.  L.A.D.)  (.065) (.136) (.087) (.066) (.074) 
       
OLS, age < 75  .880  1.455  1.174   .982  .636 
  (.055) (.095) (.105) (.338) (.063) 
       
OLS, age ≥  75  .598 1.357  1.207  1.351 .370 
  (.096) (.225) (.228) (.342) (.104) 
       
 
 Notes: 
1.  Each cell of the table gives the estimated elasticity from a separate regression. 
2.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
3.  GAD mortality rates and r = .03 used except where stated to the contrary. 
4.  Controls included: couple, female, the interaction between them, and 
individual age dummies. 
5.  Sample size = 1309 (6th. row: 1474).   22
Table 6 
 
Elasticities of wealth excluding state benefits with respect to average 
working-life earnings 
 














       
OLS on positive values  1.841  2.439  2.078  2.622  1.580 
  (.153) (.189) (.189) (.572) (.206) 
       
OLS,transformed  variable    2.851 4.036 3.161 5.495 2.265 
(including  non-positives)  (.254) (.447) (.354)  (1.310)  (.323) 
       
Tobit  2.880 3.851 3.089 5.901 2.372 
  (.238) (.375) (.401)  (1.207)  (.336) 
       
Censored least absolute   2.199  2.346  1.831  3.125  1.935 
deviations  estimation  (.153) (.227) (.129) (.703) (.184) 
       
 
 Notes: 
1.  Each cell of the table gives the estimated elasticity from a separate regression. 
2.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
3.  GAD mortality rates and r = .03 used. 
4.  Controls included: couple, female, the interaction between them, and 
individual age dummies. 
5.  Sample size = 1233 in first row, 1311 in remainder. 
 
 
 
 